majorities, there were concerns that the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan might turn into extremist regimes if subjected to rapid economic change, but this consideration also had low priority in determining aid flows, at least until after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA. The significance of some Central Asian countries as minerals and energy suppliers has influenced their external relations and rising oil prices and large new discoveries in the Caspian Basin raised the region's profile after 2000, but the oil-related financial flows came from the private sector. 4 Absent substantial bilateral aid flows, much of the development assistance to Central Asia has come from multilateral institutions. 5 In 1992 the Central Asian countries joined the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and over the next decade they joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 6 The contribution of the international financial institutions in the early 1990s was largely technical, focusing on monetary arrangements in 1992-3 (see Section 3), although from mid-1993 they became more active in advocating a model of transition and supporting willing pupils with loans and grants (Section 4). By the end of the 1990s, the transition from central planning was largely completed in Central Asia, even though most of the economies were not yet well-functioning market economies, and emphasis shifted to developmental issues. Within a wider consensus on the desirability of economic growth and on the positive relationship between trade and growth, there was growing recognition that the main barrier to trade-led growth in Central Asia was high trade costs, many of which could be reduced by regional cooperation. In this context the multilateral institutions declared their intentions of 4 The main government intervention has been in influencing decisions about pipeline routes from Central Asia. While Russia has tried to obstruct any new pipelines which would undermine its monopoly, the USA pushed routes to Turkey or through Afghanistan to South Asia and threatened sanctions against any company participating in pipeline projects through Iran. In 2005, China, frustrated by Russia's preference for supplying Japan from its eastern oilfields, began construction of a pipeline to link Kazakhstan's oilfields to the Chinese network. 5 Non-governmental organizations and charities have also provided assistance, notably the Aga Khan's Development Fund, which has channelled aid especially to Tajikistan and also to the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan. Beyond economics, specialized UN agencies such as the High Commission for Refugees have provided valuable humanitarian assistance on the fringes of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and agencies like UNICEF have become more active. Neither NGOs nor these agencies will be covered here. 6 When the Soviet successor states joined the United Nations in July 1992, the Islamic successor states all opted to be in the Asian region. Membership of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) was a prerequisite for access to the Asian Development Bank. Subsequently, and uniquely in the UN system, they were also permitted to join the UN Economic Commission for Europe, which allowed them to join the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
cooperating to assist in facilitating regional cooperation, but the record of multilateral initiatives has been unimpressive.
The first section of the paper describes the Central Asian economies' situation before and after the dissolution of the USSR, and the state of international thinking about aid in the early 1990s. Because the five countries followed diverse strategies towards economic reform, it was possible to discriminate among them according to their good or bad governance as well as according to their needs. The second section examines bilateral aid to national governments, and shows that it has been predominantly driven by geopolitical, rather than development, considerations. The next two sections cover multilateral aid, analysing the technical advice given over the currency issue in 1992-3 in Section 3 and the support for a particular transition model in Section 4. The fifth section focuses on regional cooperation projects, which were clearly desirable uses of aid but where there were substantial problems of coordinating aid efforts. The final section draws conclusions. With the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 the Central Asian countries faced several major shocks. Nation building started practically from scratch, and initially failed in Tajikistan. Economic disruption, already severe due to the end 7 This section is based on Pomfret (1995; , which review the situation in the early years after independence and in the period 1995-2005 respectively. of central planning, was exacerbated by the cessation of substantial intra-USSR net transfers and by the breakdown of intra-USSR demand and supply links due to nonpayment or non-delivery of inputs. The negative impact of the collapse of the integrated Soviet economy was accentuated for the Central Asian countries by their landlocked location and inherited transport networks, which made it difficult to reorient their trade. Even if the newly independent governments wished to take time to evaluate the situation, acceleration of economic reform was unavoidable as
Background
Russia's price liberalization in January 1992 had to be followed by other countries using the common currency. At the same time the features of the ruble zone contributed to the acceleration of inflation from a triple-digit annual rate in 1991 to four-digit inflation in 1992 and 1993.
Despite the similar economic structures, the national leaders adopted surprisingly diverse economic strategies. The Kyrgyz Republic embraced the advice from western institutions and advocates of rapid change and, within limits, its president fostered the emergence of the most liberal regime in the region. Kazakhstan in the early 1990s appeared to be accompanying the Kyrgyz Republic on a liberal path, but the president became more autocratic as the decade progressed and the economy became dominated by a small group of people who controlled the media and the banks. Uzbekistan retained a tightly controlled political system, but with nothing resembling the personality cult of Turkmenistan, and its economic reforms were modest. In Turkmenistan the president had absolute personal power and minimized economic change. Tajikistan was the only one of the five countries not to evolve peacefully from Soviet republic to independent state under unchanged leadership; the bloody civil war of 1992-7 dominated political developments and delayed implementation of a serious and consistent economic strategy.
The five countries' economic performance since independence has differed (Table 2) , to some extent reflecting policy choices, although since 2000 the comparative situation has been dominated by the increase in world energy prices. This is especially true for the two largest economies; during the 1990s Kazakhstan's output performance was inferior to Uzbekistan's, but since the turn of the century Kazakhstan, as a significant oil producer which by coincidence also had major new discoveries coming on line, has experienced an economic boom while Uzbekistan's economy appears to stagnate. For Turkmenistan, with its abundant natural gas reserves, the energy boom has alleviated pressures to change the country's poor economic policies, but the opaque statistical situation in Turkmenistan makes any definite judgment hazardous. Both gradual-reforming Uzbekistan and rapidreforming Kyrgyz Republic have enjoyed less spectacular growth, and have clearly lower living standards than Kazakhstan. Tajikistan is even worse placed; as the economy has recovered but slowly from a very deep trough.
By the turn of the century, the national economies, with the possible exception of Turkmenistan's, had changed substantially from the centrally planned economy of the Soviet era and all were in one form or another a market-based economy. The 1980s were a decade of rethinking foreign aid, reflected first in stricter conditionality and then in cutbacks, especially by the USA and UK whose governments distrusted the potential of public expenditure to improve living standards. Mosley (1986) highlighted the micro-macro paradox that, although ex post evaluation suggested that aid-assisted projects yield net social benefits, at the macro level any positive effects of aid evaporate in cross-country regressions. By 1991 there was neither abundant funding for aid nor much intellectual commitment to directing capital to poor countries' governments, and any claims by the poor new countries of Central Asia for aid would run into opposition from other poor countries which would resist any reduction in their share of the shrinking aid pie.
The conventional wisdom on economic development had moved far away from the focus on capital formation of the development economics pioneers of the 1940s and 1950s. By 1990 the emphasis had shifted to human capital rather than physical capital and to incorporating institutions and political economy. Thus aid to corrupt regimes was money down the drain or, even worse, it would reinforce the hold of the government which was the source of the problem. These ideas were widespread among the young economists assigned to the Central Asia or Mongolia desks in international agencies or working in the field.
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The phenomenon of transition from central planning to more market-oriented economies was, of course, not new in 1992 and the "Washington Consensus" on the desirability of rapid economic reform was already in place. 11 On broader questions of 10 One example was Peter Boone, who was based in Mongolia as the USSR was disintegrating and whose paper published in 1996 became a standard reference (or straw-man) on how the effectiveness of aid is nullified when it encourages rent-seeking rather than productive behaviour. 11 The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson in 1989 to cover the lowest common denominator of advice being given by the IMF and World Bank to Latin American countries. In its original form the "Consensus" emphasised fiscal discipline with low marginal tax rates and public expenditure focused on human capital formation, trade and interest rate liberalization and a transition strategy, the Muslim successor states took backstage to Eastern Europe, the Baltics and Russia and Ukraine, which were either more dynamic or more important to the west. Applying the Washington Consensus to Central Asia was also complicated by the lack of a suitable model, as the initially more reformist
Kazakhstan became more autocratic. Only after the Kyrgyz Republic had established its own currency in May 1993 was this poor and poorly endowed state adopted as the torchbearer of liberalization in the region (Section 4).
Bilateral Aid
Bilateral financial aid for the Muslim successor states to the Soviet Union was minimal during the 1990s. As the USSR dissolved, the southern republics were not high on any western country's priority list. competitive exchange rate, privatization and deregulation, and secure property rights. In the transition context it became identified with rapid price liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization. Williamson (2000) examines the evolution of the term. 12 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova had been the most reluctant members of the CIS, only joining under heavy Russian pressure in late 1993 or early 1994, and together with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan participated least in CIS structures (Sakwa and Webber, 1999 In sum, bilateral aid to Central Asia has been modest in total, dominated by geopolitical rather than developmental considerations, and driven by competition among donors. 20 It has been targeted to favoured national governments and has been devoid of efforts to promote regional cooperation for economic development. Russia, in particular, has used regional trade agreements to further its political agenda, but agreement to invest a further $480 million. These numbers should be seen in the context of a country whose GDP at market prices was little over one billion dollars. They can also be contrasted with aid to Tajikistan in 2004 from the main western donors (USA $48 million, EU $24 million, Switzerland $15 million and Japan $6 million) or from the multilateral agencies (IDA $34 million, IMF $20 million and ADB $17 million), as reported by the DAC at www.oecd.org. 19 The western companies are driven by profitability and are not instruments of state policy in the same way as the large Russian and Chinese companies appear to be. They have a technical edge, eg. a reason for the original involvement of Chevron was its technical expertise. It is likely that Russian or Chinese companies may not have the technical capability to exploit the geologically difficult offshore oilfields in the northern Caspian. 20 The aid data in Table 3 is not very helpful in this context, because (apart from the usual reservations about donor-reported aid data) it reports only aid from OECD countries. The two poorest countries, the Kyrgyz republic and Tajikistan, are the two largest recipients on a per capita basis, but the Table 3 number s for these countries are dominated by multilateral aid.
these have had little economic impact. There has been little concern for the efficiency of aid delivery, and in many cases military assistance outweighs developmental assistance.
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The Ruble Zone
One of the first questions facing the new independent states at the end of 1991 was whether to introduce national currencies. were concerned with bolstering existing economic relations and preservation of a common currency was seen as a bulwark against adverse economic tendencies.
Thus, the issue was associated with the desire for economic stability within the CIS.
The desire for stability may have been shared by western policymakers, but western input into the debate over the currency issue in 1992 was on a technical rather than an ideological or geo-political basis. Although there may have been some attempts to coordinate technical assistance, given the nature of the issue the lead was taken by the IMF.
Western advice on monetary and exchange rate arrangements within the CIS was initially couched in terms of the theory of optimum currency areas. Because there were no obvious breaks in factor mobility within the CIS and internal trade far 21 In July 2004, citing human rights violations, the US State Department announced a $18 million cut in US aid, but in the next month, as Defense Secretary Rumsfeld visited Afghanistan, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Meyers, visited Tashkent and announced a $21 million increase in US military assistance, over the $39 million already committed, to Uzbekistan. 22 This section draws on Pomfret (1996, 118-29; outweighed trade with outsiders, the CIS appeared to be an optimum currency area, and conventional wisdom was strongly in favour of retaining the ruble zone after the dissolution of the USSR. Max Corden's report for the UNDP/World Bank Trade Expansion Program, with some caveats, recommended creation of a ruble zone and specifically pointed to the Central Asian countries as the ones for which the argument was likely to be strongest:
"If a republic is small, if the argument for fixing the exchange rate to the ruble is strong because trade with Russia is expected to dominate the country's trade for a long time, and if Russia is expected to succeed in stabilizing its economy, then the case for going all the way into a monetary union with Russia becomes strong. Perhaps these conditions apply for the central Asian republics. If the intention is to maintain a fixed exchange rate indefinitely, it is better to lock it in through an institutional arrangement and thus avoid any foreign exchange speculation." (Corden, 1992a, 14-5) .
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The first Economic Reviews of CIS countries published by the IMF in spring 1992
repeated the policy recommendation that the Central Asian countries should remain within the ruble zone. 24 The Central Asian countries followed this advice in 1992. Some ruble-zone members issued parallel currencies to alleviate the cash shortage, and the proliferation of parallel currencies with varying degrees of inconvertibility plus the increasing trade imbalances eroded the trade-facilitating benefit of having a common currency. Trade between ruble zone countries was disrupted by delays in payments, and more generally there was a shortage of cash which affected both domestic and intra-zone trade. The situation deteriorated after June 1992 when 23 Max Corden's influence was large because of his academic stature as one of the leaders in international economics over the last four decades and because in 1991-2 he was working for the Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC and had connections with both the IMF and World Bank. His May 1992 World Bank working paper contains essentially the same quotation (Corden, 1992b, 27) . 24 The argument was set out in the International Monetary Fund's spring 1992 World Economic Outlook (Washington DC, pp. 41-2), where introduction of new currencies was discouraged on the grounds that (a) macroeconomic stability should be achieved first and (b) intra-CIS trade would be disrupted. Russia's role was crucial because it controlled two inducements for other countries to remain in the ruble zone despite the hyperinflation: favourable ruble-denominated raw material prices and credit. Although officials from the Central Asian countries complained about paying the one percent service charge on ruble notes levied by the Russian central bank plus 20% interest on banknotes provided on credit, the interest rate was negative in real terms. During the first five months of 1993, it became increasingly obvious that Russia was using credit access for political ends. Fears that Russia might use its creditor status for political leverage were highlighted by Azerbaijan's experience (Pomfret, 1996, 103-17 The next day the World Bank announced its first credit to the Kyrgyz Republic of $60 million through its soft loan arm, the International Development Agency (IDA). Cofinancing of $70 million was promised by Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
These were the first substantial amounts of western aid to an Islamic Soviet successor state, and were also connected to the emergence of the Kyrgyz Republic as the regional showcase for economic liberalism analysed in the next section.
In June 1993 Russia adopted a tougher line on credit towards ruble-zone countries. Negotiations with Kazakhstan broke down because Russia wanted settlement of intergovernmental debts (where it was the creditor), but would not link a small proportion of the currency in circulation by year's end. As the military conflict over NagornoKarabakh escalated, culminating in the Armenian invasion in April, the Russian central bank ceased granting credits to Azerbaijan and the emission of rubles practically ceased after March. Emissions of manat increased to finance the war, the ruble began to trade at a premium to the official exchange rate, and rubles effectively disappeared from circulation; during the first five months of 1993 about threefifths of the rubles issued in Azerbaijan left the country, mostly converted into goods from other rublezone countries. The manat had de facto left the ruble zone by June 1993, as hyperinflation peaked and the government was overthrown in a coup which led to the return to power of a Brezhnev-era leader. 28 The failure of education about the impact of issuing national currencies was not restricted to policymakers in Central Asia. The western press reaction was surprisingly negative, and as with the introduction of other new currencies (eg. The Financial Times, London, 15 May 1992, had described the introduction of the Latvian currency as 'a suicidal step' which would precipitate further collapse of trade with Russia) the som's introduction was predicted to lead to trade disruption ('Out of Steppe' was the headline in the Far Eastern Economic Review). The Wall Street Journal ran a story on resistance to internal acceptability of the new currency, but this difficulty had disappeared within a week. The Economist also took a negative tack with its headline 'Battle of the Som'. In fact, there was no major disruption of intra-CIS trade; Uzbekistan closed its border with the Kyrgyz Republic and stopped bank transfers between the two countries on the day the som was issued, while Kazakhstan kept trade flowing by granting credit to its neighbour, but these differing reactions by the Kyrgyz Republic's two larger neighbours are explained by political rather than by economic considerations.
this to inter-enterprise debts (where Russian enterprises were debtors to Kazakhstan). The IMF and the World Bank have difficulty reconciling the pressures for a single 'company line' on key policy issues, with the inherent imprecision of answers to major economic questions. In January 1992 it was not obvious whether the ruble zone should be maintained and, if so, by which countries and for how long, and the analytical problem was exacerbated by the IMF's lack of regional expertise. 31 In the first half of 1992, it would have been better to air pros and cons of a common currency rather than trying to present a unified front, and to indicate to national policymakers that in a novel and highly unstable setting the best course of action was uncertain. Of course, it is difficult to be a two-handed economist when policymakers want definite answers, but the IMF did not try, and the representatives on the spot often did nothing to discourage an impression that they were the experts in this area. Uzbekistan's policymakers paid no attention to IMF advice, even though it was much more firmly based than the more debatable 1992 analysis of the ruble zone, and felt 31 Both the IMF and the World Bank were going through a learning phase in 1990-2. From having few staff familiar with the transition from central planning and almost none with knowledge of Central Asia, they soon had some. 32 Although the IMF sent occasional missions from Washington, day-to-day technical assistance was being provided through resident representatives and consultants. The unified position may have been related to a desire to monitor these IMF employees, many of whom were new or temporary, but it also appears to have been driven by a paternalistic desire not to confuse local policymakers. The IMF's influence was especially strong in Central Asia because there were few opportunities for national policymaker to obtain well-informed second opinions, and few people within national administrations with a good understanding of how market-based economies functioned at the macroeconomic level. The IMF and World Bank provided training programs, especially at the Joint Vienna Center, which were important in creating a group of mid-level officials with economic knowledge, but senior politicians and officials could not take time off running their country in order to study economics and had to learn on the job.
vindicated when Malaysia, seen by many in Central Asia as the model of successful economic development in an Islamic country, introduced capital controls after the 1997 Asian Crisis. The fact that the Malaysian controls were much lighter and fairly quickly eased was ignored, and Uzbekistan was condemned to learn the costs of draconian exchange controls by experience over the next decade. This episode is important for regional economic cooperation, because the absence of a convertible currency in Uzbekistan, the country at the geographical heart of Central Asia, has been a fundamental obstacle to regional trade and transit. More generally, all multilateral agencies found that the process of convincing policymakers of the gains from trade was undermined by suspicion that the advice was driven by considerations other than technical analysis.
Multilateral Aid for National Governments
The IMF and World Bank were associated with a particular position on the transition from central planning. The Washington Consensus of the early and mid-1990s was not shared equally by all staff, but it remained the company line until a new position was adopted in the later 1990s (articulated most forcefully by the World Bank's new chief economist in, for example, Stiglitz, 1998) . Although the choice of a transition and development strategy was an important issue, the desire to maintain a common front was less harmful than on the currency issue. First, other multilateral institutions could offer alternative perspectives and domestic policymakers felt better placed to judge the arguments than on the monetary issue. 33 Second, despite heated debates over shock therapy versus gradualism in the early transition period, these fizzled out by the end of the 1990s. The appropriate speed of reform could be debated, but there was substantial agreement about content (price liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization are critical elements of transition and the other parts of the Consensus were sensible components of a development strategy), and the speed issue was passé by the end of the century. 33 The UNDP distanced itself from the Washington Consensus, often advocating a more gradual approach to the transition from central planning and focussing on social sectors rather than macropolicy. There has, however, been convergence since the World Bank and IMF in 1999 introduced a new approach to their relations with low-income countries, centred on preparation of poverty reduction strategies by national governments, and as the ADB made poverty alleviation an overarching policy for all loan proposals.
The Kyrgyz Republic quickly became established as the model country in Central Asia and, starting with the May 1993 assistance for the establishment of the new national currency, it was the leading recipient of multilateral aid. 34 In 1992
Kazakhstan rather than the Kyrgyz Republic was the reforming leader in Central Asia (Pomfret, 1995, 53-7) , but the initial reforming impetus became dissipated in struggles over natural resource rents and the spread the corruption, so that outside observers increasingly worried about a crisis of governance.
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Meanwhile, the resource-poor Kyrgyz Republic had little room for manoeuvre. The dissolution of the USSR and early stages of transition had been highly disruptive to the Kyrgyz economy; average incomes fell from already low levels and inequality increased, leading to the highest poverty rates in all of the former USSR and eastern Europe in 1993 (Milanovic, 1998 36 The drop in real output in the 34 After the dissolution of the USSR, the IFIs' focus was on supporting "reformist" elements in the ongoing political struggles in Russia and, although the Washington institutions established resident representatives in many of the southern republics and provided training services in-country and abroad, these transition economies were not high priorities in 1992. 35 See Kalyuzhnova (1998) , Olcott (2002) -the latter had circulated widely in draft since at least 1998 -and references in Pomfret (2005) . Dissolution of Parliament and President Nazarbayev's manipulation of the March 1994 election also cast doubt on Kazakhstan's democratic credentials. 36 The Kyrgyz Republic was also lauded as an island of democracy and an open society in a region of autocracies and intolerance, but the "island of democracy" image is an oversimplified perspective. President Akayev ruled by decree when he considered it necessary to push through desirable legislation first half of the 1990s was larger than in most non-war-torn Soviet successor states and the increase in poverty was traumatic, especially in the poor rural areas of the south.
The Kyrgyz Republic's success in generating foreign aid is reflected in World
Bank commitments up to the end of 1996 of $70 per capita, compared to $49 in Kazakhstan, $11 in Uzbekistan, $6 in Turkmenistan and $1 in Tajikistan. During the second half of the decade annual aid flows to the Kyrgyz Republic averaged about $50-60 per head of population, which is high by international standards (Table 3) .
From 1992 to 2000 international aid to the Kyrgyz Republic amounted to $1.7 billion, over half of which came from the major multilateral agencies: the World Bank provided 23%, the Asian Development Bank 15%, IMF 15%, and EBRD 5%.
37
The financial assistance enabled the government to reduce inflation without balancing domestically generated revenue and expenditure. As tax revenue fell during the early stages of transition, expenditures were not cut commensurately and the budget deficit peaked at 17% of GDP in 1995. The deficit was reduced after 1995, with less draconian expenditure cuts than would have been required in the absence of foreign aid. The Kyrgyz Republic's budget required practically no inflationary financing by the central bank in 1997 or 1998, due to huge external support rather than balancing the domestic books (Pomfret, 2004) . Success in reducing inflation could then be used as evidence that the country had been deserving of support, because its economic reform strategy and economic policies were sound, although it was really the foreign aid which had underpinned the success in reducing inflation.
Macroeconomic stabilization is an important achievement, but in the Kyrgyz
Republic it came at a high price in terms of external debt. International aid in the 1990s was provided about one fifth in grants and four-fifths in loans. Even if World Bank, ADB, IMF and EBRD loans were provided on better than commercial terms, they still had to be serviced and eventually repaid. By mid-1998 external debt exceeded $1 billion, over half of which was on concessional terms from multilateral institutions; the main items were $267 million owed to the World Bank's concessional (especially in 1994-6) , and his western supporters generally turned a blind eye (Kubicek, 1998) . He was as unwilling as other Central Asian presidents to allow establishment of a political process that could lead to changes in power. Nevertheless, under Akayev the media flourished more in the Kyrgyz Republic than elsewhere in Central Asia and the feeling of oppression was less than in other countries. 37 The major bilateral donors were Japan (15% of the total), and Germany, Switzerland and the EU (each 4% Until the late 1990s, the government acted as though the foreign aid could be used to smooth out the consumption shock from transition and the dissolution of the USSR, without worrying about investing the funds in order to generate the foreign exchange earnings necessary to service or repay the loans. 39 In 2002, when the debt/GDP ratio was over 100%, the Kyrgyz Republic was forced to turn to the Paris Club for rescheduling.
The Kyrgyz Republic's debt problem, now the worst in the CIS, arose because both the IFIs and the Kyrgyz government underestimated the depth and length of the transitional recession, and hence failed to recognize how much consumption smoothing could be achieved by loans without creating an unrepayable debt (Helbling et al., 2003) . One problem with this analysis is that in the dire situation of 1992-6 it would have been difficult for the government to reduce consumption by any more than actually happened (the Kyrgyz Republic had the highest poverty rate of any transition economy in 1993; only Tajikistan suffered more in the later 1990s, and that was due to civil war). The Washington Consensus policy package exacerbated the short-run costs of transition, and if the IFIs really wanted the Kyrgyz Republic to adopt this policy package then it should have been supported with an aid package containing more grants and fewer loans. As with any delinquent debtor, the Kyrgyz government could be criticized for failing to borrow within its means, but blame also lay with the IFIs which lent without due diligence in assessing ability to repay or full explanation of the need to repay.
The other four Central Asian countries have all received less aid per capita than the Kyrgyz Republic ( Turkmenistan's gradualism has been a synonym for non-reform, and its relations with the IFIs have been minimal. The government is autocratic, with an 40 Kazakhstan's slide into authoritarianism could be seen as a necessary response to the delicate ethnic balance, but, once President Nazarbayev embarked on this path, concern for state stability transformed into concern for his own political longevity and "a solid undemocratic foundation" was laid (Bremmer and Welt, 1996) . At the same time, privatization of large enterprises, especially in the natural resource sector, at giveaway prices created a new rich class and an aura of corruption (Pomfret, 2005) . As mentioned earlier, the ethnic situation and strong economic links kept Kazakhstan closely aligned to Russia. 41 Some of the good performance may reflect optimistic data, but Taube and Zettelmeyer (1998) conclude that only a small part of Uzbekistan's performance can be explained away as a statistical artefact. 42 Uzbekistan's disbursements form the IMF ( The IMF has limited itself to technical assistance. Turkmenistan did not join the ADB until 2001, perhaps seeing the Asian agency as a counter-weight to the Washington-based institutions which were providing negative publicity about the country's economic policies. 44 The first financial assistance from the IMF and World Bank was in 1996, but after the resumption of violence in December 1996 and kidnapping of UN and Red Cross personnel in early 1997 the IMF and World Bank resident representatives were evacuated in February (they returned in May). IMF staff were involved in developing the new economic reform program after October 1997. The main source of western assistance to Tajikistan until then was humanitarian aid mainly from the USA, the EU and its member states, and UN agencies (UNDP, Tajikistan Human Development Report 1997, pp. 103-4) . 45 Praise of democratic tendencies followed identification of the Kyrgyz Republic as a model of economic reform in Central Asia rather than being the reason for aid, and in the mid-1990s President Akayev governed autocratically without loss of his preferred status among western leaders. Elsewhere in the region, the IFIs' aid has shown little relation to the degree of democracy, with no assistance going to relatively democratic Azerbaijan in 1992 and 1993. The limited aid to Uzbekistan and to Turkmenistan is as well explained by these countries' failure to embrace the Washington Consensus economic policies as by their undemocratic regimes. Increased aid to Azerbaijan from 1995 onwards followed unilateral adoption of economic stabilization by an undemocratic regime; neither the policies nor the nature of the regime were much affected by the provision of western aid.
The general record and reputation of the international agencies has probably improved as the national governments have learned, to varying degrees, to work with them. The mixed performance of the Kyrgyz Republic has not obviously strengthened the credibility of the IFIs' advice; by accepting the whole Washington Consensus package the Kyrgyz Republic has entered the ranks of the highly indebted poor countries. Nevertheless, many micro projects supported by technical assistance and loans from the IFIs have been beneficial. The outcome has been that governments have learned to be more wary of taking on loans and discriminating in their relations with the IFIs.
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The major multilateral economic institutions have pursued similar country priorities in Central Asia, but there has been some institutional differentiation by functional area. The IMF remains the principal provider of advice and assistance on macroeconomic problems, but the demand for such advice and assistance has diminished. The World Bank has been lead advisor on structural adjustment, public finances and financial sector reform. 47 The ADB was rather slow to become involved in Central Asia but, together with ESCAP, it has focussed on transport and other infrastructure projects. The EBRD is distinguished by its orientation towards the private sector, and much of its lending has gone to promote small and medium enterprises in the region, but it still has to deal with national governments and it made a disastrous decision when it held its 2003 annual meetings in Uzbekistan.
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Although the common country priorities and the agreed functional differentiation sound as though they would provide a solid basis for promoting regional cooperation where that is needed in Central Asia, the record on regional cooperation has been disappointing. The next section analyses why the multilateral agencies (and bilateral 46 The generalization is also complicated by the concessional component of aid, eg. for Uzbekistan almost all IFI assistance has been on non-concessional terms (Lane, 2003, 17) which presumably reinforces awareness of the repayment issues. There is also greater comprehension that the IFIs are not simply pawns of the Western powers and that they may have their own motives, including pressures on desk officers to make loans. 47 Since the introduction of the Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper (PRSP) process in 1999 the IMF and World Bank have explicitly aimed to coordinate their advice and assistance in conjunction with national stakeholders. There are, however, concerns over 'mission creep', and some commentators (eg. the Meltzer Commission in the USA) have criticized the IMF's involvement in poverty reduction. 48 Holding the 2003 meetings in Tashkent was intended as a signal of the EBRD's increased attention to Central Asia as its eastern European and Baltic clients were about to join the European Union, but the EBRD set targets on human rights issues such as the elimination of torture which the Uzbekistan government was not prepared to meet; EBRD involvement in Uzbekistan was substantially reduced in 2004, and the only multilateral institution left with an active program in Uzbekistan was the Asian Development Bank.
aid donors) have been so ineffective in promoting regional cooperation even when the benefits appear to be obvious and large
Regional Cooperation and Multilateral Aid
There are several reasons for regional cooperation in Central Asia.
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External assistance can help to realize the benefits from regional cooperation by creating supernational institutions, fostering trust, and providing expertise and finance. Where agreement is needed on sharing regional public goods such as water resources, an external 'honest-broker' can help to establish the higher authority which will settle disputes over the distribution of costs and benefits or facilitate renegotiation of arrangements as circumstances change.
Water resource management (including the desiccation of the Aral Sea and related energy supply issues) is the most critical area for regional cooperation in Central Asia, but also one of the least tractable. The failure to take any common action on the desiccation of the Aral Sea is symptomatic of the inability of Central Asia's leaders to cooperate on a pressing regional issue, and the record of aid to deal with the Aral Sea disaster is poor. Security matters have been dominant since 1999, and have entered the international spotlight since September 2001, but they are not likely to provide an arena for cooperation among aid donors. 50 Trade facilitation, while more mundane, is an area in which stepwise progress could be made to reduce foregone opportunities for mutually beneficial trade, due to impediments such as unnecessary delays or bureaucracy at border crossings or in transit, and official or unofficial taxes on traders.
(a) The Aral Sea.
The Aral Sea poses an environmentally serious but also intractable problem because the states involved can only see short-term economic costs from addressing the environmental disaster. The problem is straightforward. Ever increasing demands on the water of the two river systems feeding the Aral Sea, the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers, have so far reduced the amount of water reaching the Aral Sea, the world's fourth-biggest lake (after the Caspian, Lake Superior and Lake Victoria) as recently as 1960, that between 1960 and 2000 the Aral Sea's area fell by half, its volume by 80% and the shoreline receded by 60-80 kilometres as it subdivided into two small lakes.
The fisheries and other sea-based activities were destroyed by the end of the 1980s.
The shrinking of the Aral Sea has changed climate patterns, increasing extremes of heat and cold, shrinking growing seasons and reducing crop yields. Exposure of the sea bed has been accompanied by dust storms carrying toxic chemicals (a legacy of the fertilizer-intensive nature of Soviet cotton-farming) for thousands of kilometres.
Morbidity rates have risen in the affected areas, especially in Karakalpakstan and
Dashkoguz, where high levels of anaemia contribute to underweight babies and high infant mortality rates, and respiratory diseases, dysentery, hepatitis, typhoid and tuberculosis, associated with poor water supply and sanitation, are also prevalent.
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The solution is straightforward in principle: reduce the quantity of water being taken out of the river systems. Before 1992 water was allocated by the central authorities in Moscow using formula-driven methods which the Central Asian republics had little power to dispute, but which clearly needed to be revised in order to reverse the desiccation of the Aral Sea. After independence, the Central Asian leadership looked for technical fixes, and Weinthal (2002, 195) argues that it was the (mistaken) prospect of funding for such schemes that led them to welcome international financial institutions' involvement in the Aral Sea after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, no institution was prepared to provide anything like the amount of funds needed to finance the grand technical schemes. 52 When instead all they could offer was advice to reduce water-usage, this fell on deaf ears and attempts to foster regional cooperation were doomed to failure. 51 The most directly affected regions -the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm in northwest Uzbekistan, Kyzylorda and South Kazakhstan, and Dashkoguz in northern Turkmenistanare among the poorest areas of the respective countries. The full extent of the health problem is difficult to assess because few outsiders travel to Karakalpakstan and Dashkoguz, and the authorities conceal much of what happens there. In Kazakhstan, where the authorities are more open, mutations are reported. 52 A Soviet-era scheme to divert waters from the River Ob in Siberia to Central Asia is sometimes revived, usually by Russian politicians considering the geopolitical benefits of increasing Central Asian dependence on Russia. Yuri Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow and an influential Russian politician, for example, has campaigned for the Ob-diversion project, arguing that Russia has plenty of water to sell and the $34 billion project is necessary to forestall a huge wave of Central Asian immigrants pushed into Russia by water-related economic failure in Central Asia.
The World Bank, which played the lead role in negotiations in the mid-1990s, whom the ICWC had no authority (Weinthal, 2002 (Weinthal, , 1845 . In 1997 the World Bank closed its office due to lack of effective progress in coordinating actions with respect to the Aral Sea.
The World Bank's narrow focus on water failed, but other approaches fared no better, eg. the attempts by USAid to create new structures linking water and energy issues were naïve considering the entrenched power of the existing bureaucracies.
For international organizations and foreign economists the least confrontational solution would be to use the price mechanism to allocate a reduced amount of water to competing demands. Apart from the Kyrgyz Republic, which adopted legislation in July 2001 making water a tradable commodity, and some quarters in Kazakhstan, however, most Central Asian policymaking elites have a deep antipathy to the concept for cultural reasons associated with the role of water in this arid region, and also because of concerns about fairness and opportunities for corruption, technical monitoring problems, and the inability of the poorest farmers to afford any but negligibly low prices for irrigation water. Despite the downstream countries' reservations about using prices in international trade in water, where they are importers and hence satisfied with a zero price, water pricing is likely to come eventually to the downstream countries because it is the most efficient way to allocate water domestically -but it will not be forced on them by external agencies.
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A major component of any solution to the Aral Sea problem should be to increase the efficiency with which water is used in Central Asia, where profligate practices were encouraged in the Soviet era, but national governments refuse to accept externally imposed agrarian reform. In the absence of improved water-use efficiency, however, reduction in the amount of water available for irrigation will make any agriculture denied water infeasible in the arid conditions of Central Asia. This would be especially disastrous for Turkmenistan, most of whose agriculture draws on water carried by the Karakum Canal, a 1300 kilometre open channel westwards from the Amudarya River, which has been the single main contributor to the shrinking of the Aral Sea. 55 Apart from unequal sharing of costs and benefits across countries, there would also be intra-country conflicts of interest; much of the irrigated area of Tajikistan is marginal agricultural land with poor farmers who would be hard hit by reduced availability of water, while in Uzbekistan the areas where irrigated agriculture should be discontinued rather than reformed are concentrated in Kashkadarya province (World Bank, 2002, vol.1, vii) . In international negotiations on how to deal with the Aral Sea crisis, agricultural change has been kept off the agenda.
Given the huge obstacles to negotiating an international solution, existing intra-state agreements, administered by the ICWC, have essentially maintained the pre-1992 status quo under which Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are allocated over 70% of the water in the Amudarya and Syrdarya river systems, while the upstream countries the Kyrgyz Republic (source of 25% of the water) and Tajikistan (source of 55%) are allocated 0.4% and 11% respectively; 16% is allocated to the Aral Sea and a small proportion to northern Afghanistan. The upstream 54 Water is implicitly priced in the energy-for-water barter agreements because there is no exogenously determined price for the energy component of the swaps. 55 President Niyazov seems, if anything, intent on enhancing the irrigated agricultural area in Turkmenistan, and some observers have speculated that if Turkmenistan proceeds with plans to build a huge artificial lake in the country's desert that could trigger war with Uzbekistan. Water conflicts between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan already existed as a result of Turkmenistan's construction of a canal to (inefficiently) bypass Uzbekistan and secure its own water, and accusations by Uzbekistan that Turkmenistan has been failing to maintain pumping stations at Karshi and Amu-Bukhara that serve Uzbekistan or to clean drains through which water passes from Turkmenistan to Uzbekistan. has operated below capacity and also because Afghanistan has not fully used its water entitlement. In the future, economic stability and growth in Afghanistan could lead in short order to increased use for irrigation because the left-bank of the Amudarya is suited to gravity irrigation without the need for investment in pumping facilities.
In sum, efforts to resolve the Aral Sea problem have been ineffective beyond the short-term achievement of avoiding water wars, and the situation will get worse.
The fundamental problem is that all parties, but especially the downstream (and more conservative) countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, are defensive about their perceived national interests, unwilling to countenance the necessary domestic changes in agriculture, and suspicious of any change in the current inter-state arrangements (Horsman, 2001) . All attempts at multilateral solutions have been doomed due to a lack of political will on the part of the national governments to accept the costs needed to realize the obvious (global) benefits. Uzbekistan suddenly re-introduced tight foreign exchange controls in response to a balance of payments problem triggered by falling cotton prices. Similarly draconian controls were imposed by Turkmenistan in December 1998. After the August 1998 Russian crisis, which hit Kazakhstan hardest among the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan imposed special tariffs as high as 200% on a number of goods imported from the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan and in April 1999 the Kazakh tenge was floated, which led to an effective fifty percent devaluation. Border enforcement has at times been lax and at other times rigorous, with occasional total closure, eg. for several months in 1999 Uzbekistan unilaterally closed all but one of the posts along its border with Kazakhstan. Such actions are often unpredictable and may be only discovered upon arrival at the border. In July 2000 Kazakhstan increased the bond required from customs agents from $5000 to $20,000, a measure justified by government officials in terms of concerns about the financial stability of smaller brokerage firms and expected to reduce the number of customs agents from 75 to 15, but exporters to Kazakhstan were concerned about the anti-competitive impact of the reduced number of agents. 58 The tragedy of the commons arises from too many people having access to a common resource, such as fisheries; each fisher has an incentive to catch as much as possible because any individual conservation strategy will be ineffective as fish left in the water will be caught by other fishers. The tragedy of the anti-commons arises when too many people have the potential to hold-up an activity by levying taxes or imposing other costs. As in the tragedy of the commons, each hold-up agent will ignore potential externalities of their actions and try to maximize current benefits, in this case leading to too little rather than too much of the activity actually taking place. maximize their own "tax" on the transit trade, the trade was choked off, to almost everybody's disadvantage. Moreover if the trade is cut off for some time, it will not be a simple matter to restart it, because connections will have been lost and new channels to Russian wholesalers will have to be established.
Why do these lose-lose situations arise? Each individual with the power to levy a fee along the road from the farm in the Kyrgyz Republic to the onion market in Russia thinks only of maximizing their own returns. Given that the trader has started out on the enterprise, he or she will be willing to pay the extra cost as long as the shipment retains value, but at some stage the trader will look at the total costs and decide it is not worth trying to make a new shipment. There is a coordination problem, because each levier of fees will not consider this possible effect of their combined actions. Such impediments to trade tend to be very specific and often individually minor, but it is important to see the big picture of their overall effect. If impediments to trade are sufficiently large, trade will be choked off with no prospect of realizing the potential gains from trade.
How large are the social costs of impediments to trade within the region?
Without trade it is not always clear how much has been lost, because the alternative with-trade situation is not observed. Measurement of something that does not happen is always difficult, and even rough estimates are hard to make when we have little idea of potential areas of comparative advantage or of the relevant demand and supply curves. The burdens of trade impediments are likely to be heaviest in markets where supply is elastic. If demand is also elastic, then relatively small impediments will cut trade volumes far below potential. This is likely to best describe household or labour-intensive activities, like the Kyrgyz onion farmers, underlining the regressive impact of trade impediments which are likely to hit the poor hardest. Beyond basic necessities, the demand for non-luxury consumption goods is likely to be more price elastic, so that the non-rich members of the community will be hit as consumers. A useful role for external agencies is to provide estimates of the net benefits from removing trade impediments and to publicize who bears the costs, and perhaps assist financially with the adjustment costs.
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59 Schiff and Winters (2002, 10-11) include this in their list ways in which international organizations can promote regional cooperation. They also emphasise the potential for international organizations to act as honest brokers in determining a fair allocation of costs and benefits and they provide several interesting case studies, although surprisingly they claim the Aral Sea as an example of successful regional cooperation fostered by the World Bank and UNEP.
The internal levies are an example of the cost to traders from the failure to establish the authority of the central government or even a breakdown of law and order. The solution in more established areas of flourishing intra-regional trade is for the government to exert its influence to prevent a tragedy of the anti-commons. In the new states of Central Asia it is necessary to convince governments that they should play this role. Enforceability of contracts is critical to the smooth operation of a market economy, and so is protection from arbitrary intrusion into property rights; in Central Asia these are inadequately addressed by the national governments, although with the ongoing process of nation-building things may be improving. 60 Since the early 1990s, contracts have been especially difficult to enforce when the dispute is between people in different jurisdictions, and an obstacle to international cooperation to promote the enforceability of contracts is the mutual mistrust between the political entities.
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Transit is an area where regional cooperation is clearly desirable, especially
given the landlocked status of the Central Asian countries and their long preindependence history of free transit within the region. Since 1991 transit rights have varied, and it is difficult to even establish transit rates, which are often levied irregularly by local police. An often cited figure from the late 1990s is of lorries travelling through Kazakhstan from the Kyrgyz Republic to Russia paying on average ten such levies, amounting to an average of $1,700. Uzbekistan's complaints about transit charges in Kazakhstan include unofficial and local levies, as well as national measures.
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When tensions between the two countries have risen, the Kazakh 60 The beneficiaries from internal levies and other sources of corruption may be protected by the government. Allocation of remunerative jobs in the customs service is a way for politicians to keep their clients happy and in some cases the point of complex regulations seems to be to increase the potential unofficial earnings of such clients. The solution is to convince the central government that it is better served by an efficient public service, in which employees will need to be paid attractive salaries. 61 When fees are levied or regulations imposed in differing countries, there is a tendency to see the benefits as accruing to the country levying the fees and the costs being born by foreigners, especially with transit trade where there is no impact on domestic consumers. The problem is complicated because there are genuine reasons to charge fees for road and rail use or to regulate axle size of lorries and so forth, but, if the sum of the fees or the heterogeneity of the rules chokes off trade, then nobody benefits. 62 Kazakhstan's regulations impose additional fees if the truck's weight or size exceeds certain limits and if the truck deviates from its previously specified route The maximum weight of trucks allowed to enter Kazakhstan is 36 tons, which is less than international standards (normally between 38 and 54 tons) and Uzbekistan's 40 ton limit. Lack of agreement on the limit makes it likely that an Uzbek truck entering Kazakhstan will have to pay $100-150 for exceeding the Kazakhstani limit. Agreements on the use of refrigerated rail cars also broke down and were not renewed in 1999, leading Uzbekistan to find alternative routes for shipping perishable goods. Any railcars passing through Kazakhstan are authorities have closed part of the Tashkent-Samarkand main road which passes through Kazakhstan territory, imposing a long detour along minor roads for travellers between the two largest cities of Uzbekistan. Using these practices as justification, Uzbekistan has introduced its own restrictive measures, which is especially important given the crossroads location of. Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan, which has the only railway south from Central Asia and the main port on the east coast of the Caspian Sea, could be a significant route for other Central Asian countries' international trade, but levies high transit fees. This hard line, although short-sighted, is not surprising given the extent to which Turkmenistan has suffered from transit fees charged by Russia on gas exports to Ukraine and the Caucasus. Nevertheless, it is a stark example of the tragedy of the anti-commons by which the imposition of a series of high transit charges along roads crossing several countries chokes off the trade so that nobody benefits. With the help of the Asian Development Bank, the two countries signed a CrossBorder Agreement on 15 th . November 1999 to ease the movement of people, goods and vehicles across the common border. To try to ensure that this does not become just another paper agreement, implementation has been given a contractual basis by writing it into the conditions of the ADB loans and technical assistance grants to the two countries for the Almaty-Bishkek regional road rehabilitation project. Among its terms, the Cross-Border Agreement provides exemption from export and import duties on transit trade, attempts to standardize customs documentation and procedures, and brings truck weights and dimensions, as well as vehicle inspection and clearance procedures, on to a common basis. Bilateral relations between the two countries were the most cordial in Central Asia and may have been sufficiently good to achieve these goals without external assistance and the coverage of the CrossBorder Agreement is limited, but nevertheless the ADB's intervention at a minimum accelerated the process of regional cooperation to facilitative transit.
Conclusions
This paper analyses why it has been difficult to coordinate aid for projects which require regional cooperation and whose economic benefits appear to be so clearly positive. After setting out the background and history of aid provision to the Central Asian countries which became independent in 1991, the paper analyses the interests both real and perceived of major players: aid donors, national governments and groups within countries. Much bilateral aid has been viewed through the zero-sum prism of geopolitical competition, and individual donors have shown little interest in promoting regional cooperation. Geopolitical considerations have also characterized the proliferation of regional trade agreements, and have prevented regional organizations from effectively addressing region-wide issues such as transit.
Multilateral agencies have an opportunity to promote regional cooperation by offering technical advice and support, by acting as an honest broker in negotiations, and by providing funding to compensate losers or to reduce other obstacles. The initial steps in Central Asia during the 1990s were unsuccessful because the reputation for impartial advice was tarnished by the IMF's position on the ruble zone (ie. by assuming a strong company line on a topic where the appropriate advice was unclear) and because the World Bank's regional focus was on an important but in the circumstances intractable regional problem (desiccation of the Aral Sea). Other multilateral economic agencies arrived on the scene later and took time to establish a presence and create an identity.
The prospects for coordinating multilateral aid for regional cooperation are improving in the twenty-first century. Donor cooperation in the CIS-7 initiative of aid for the poorest CIS countries (which include the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) was a step towards institutional coordination, although the prospects for regional cooperation within this framework are hindered by the composition of the CIS-7, which does not include Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan. The ADB has been designated as the lead institution on matters of transport and transit and cooperated with the UNDP in an analysis of regional cooperation on trade, transport and transit, which placed a strong emphasis on national involvement (UNDP, 2005; ADB, 2006) .
These studies have highlighted the potential win-win outcomes which exist for regional cooperation in trade facilitation and made a first attempt to calculate the gains from regional cooperation.
What lessons can be drawn from the experience of coordinating aid for regional cooperation in Central Asia? To date, the results have been disappointing, indicating pitfalls to avoid in a region where the potential benefits from cooperation are large. A key role for aid donors is to provide technical assistance in analysing and explaining benefits, and how these affect the various interests -a role which requires establishment of a reputation for honest-dealing and technical competence. Donors may facilitate implementation by providing financial assistance, although, as illustrated by the Aral Sea programs of 1992-7, this alone is unlikely to be sufficient to promote regional cooperation when the national governments are unconvinced of the benefits. A better strategy in the context of national jealousies and suspicions is to start with less contentious areas for cooperation, especially if it is possible to identify win-win situations, as in areas of transit and trade facilitation. Bank (1992, 3-4) ; columns 3-4, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992 , Table  U13 ) -based on Goskomstat data (HBS). 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1999; 1989 =100 (14) 268 (18) 240 (50) 198 (36) 161 (26) 144 (23) 24 (5) 27 (6) 158 (7) 194 ( 
